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Abstract 
 
 The large literature on “tagging” shows that group specific tax and transfer 
schedules improve welfare over the case where the government is restricted to a single 
schedule over the whole population.  The central assumption, however, is that the 
groupings available to the government are given and fixed.  But how many and which 
types of groups should the government choose to tag?  This is the question addressed in 
this paper.  Starting with a simple framework and ending with numerical simulations 
based on data from Finland, we show how groupings should be formed for tagging, and 
provide a quantitative assessment of how group differences affect the gains from tagging, 
and of the marginal welfare gains from increasing the number of groups being tagged.  
We hope that these results are the first steps in a richer analysis of tagging which expands 
the question of design to the arena of choice over groups being tagged. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 We are grateful to Spencer Bastani, Sören Blomquist, Bas Jacobs and the seminar participants at Uppsala 
University for useful comments and suggestions on an earlier version of this paper. 
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1. Introduction 
 
It is widely recognized that there are potentially severe incentive and other costs 
of administering income-related transfers.  One way of overcoming these costs is to 
differentiate the population by easily observable indicators that are correlated with the 
unobservable characteristic of interest.  An individual's labour market status or 
demographic attributes, for instance, may convey information on underlying 
productivity.2  Transfers can then be made contingent upon such characteristics.  Akerlof 
(1978)3 was among the first to recognise that the use of contingent information to 
implement several tax/transfer schedules, one for each group, was bound to be superior to 
being restricted to a single schedule for the whole population.  However, he did not say 
much about the quantitative gain from such differentiation, nor about the shapes of the 
schedules for the different groups. 
 
The two decades following Akerlof’s (1978) seminal publication saw the 
application and extension of the idea in a number of different directions and settings. 
Kanbur (1987) and Besley and Kanbur (1988) applied the idea to the targeting of anti-
poverty transfers in developing countries.  Kanbur and Keen (1989) provide some 
characterizations of linear group specific tax/transfer schedules with incentive effects.  
The design of distinct nonlinear income tax/transfer schemes for sub-groups of the 
population linked by intergroup transfers was provided by Immonen, Kanbur, Keen and 
Tuomala (1998) (hereafter IKKT), with a focus on two key issues:  what are the shapes of 
optimal tax/transfer schedules when categorical information can be used to apply 
different schedules to different groups, and how substantial are the potential welfare 
gains from applying distinct schedules to distinct groups?  The interplay between income-
relation and categorical benefits is also examined by Stern (1982).  A number of other 
papers have considered optimal taxes with tagging.  For example, Bennett (1987) 
explores lump-sum transfers between different types of individuals, and Parsons (1996) 
studies the optimal benefit structure of an earnings insurance program when “eligibility 
requirements” are used as a tag to (imperfectly) identify those who are out of work.  
 
The continuing power of the tagging idea is shown by a burgeoning literature 
post-2000, which has become more specific and considers tagging across different types 
of groupings.  Viard (2001a, b) studies tagging in an optimal linear income tax 
framework allowing the demogrants to differ across groups but not the income tax rates; 
Alesina et al. (2007) advocate tagging based on gender; Blumkin, Margalioth, and Sadka 
(2009) examine the redistributive role of  affirmative action policy, asking whether, 
supplementing the tax-transfer system with an affirmative action policy would enhance 
social welfare; Mankiw and Weinzierl (2010) study a model with many skill types who 
can be tagged on the basis of height; Jacquet and Van der Linden consider  stigma in the 
tagging model; Cremer et al (2010) study the properties of tagging in an optimal income 
tax framework assuming quasi-linear preferences and a Rawlsian social welfare function; 
                                                 
2 Mirrlees (1971) noticed: "One might obtain information about a man’s income-earning potential from his 
apparent I.Q., the number of his degrees, his address, age or colour..." 
3 In fact the two-tier social dividend system in Meade report (1978) p.271-276 is a very similar idea.  
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and Boadway and Pestieau (2006) have studied the issue of tagging with optimal income 
taxation in a two-group-two-skill-level setting.4  
 
Following Kremer (2001), age based taxation, in particular, has received 
especially close attention in the last decade.  Banks and Diamond (2010) argued that 
tagging based on age may be socially acceptable because everyone can reach a given age 
at some time during their life.  The Mirrlees Review (2011) found this argument to be 
persuasive in advocating some age-related tax reforms to influence labour market 
participation decisions by older workers and parents with school-age children.  Blomquist 
and Micheletto (2003, 2008) consider age-dependent nonlinear taxation in a dynamic 
Mirrleesian setting with heterogeneous agents and private savings using an overlapping 
generations (OLG) model where individuals face a stochastic wage process.  Bastani, 
Blomquist and Micheletto (2013) examine the quantitative implications of implementing 
an optimal age-dependent nonlinear labor income tax and Weinzierl (2011) similarly 
provides a quantitative assessment of the welfare gains from age-dependent nonlinear 
income taxes.5 
 
The tagging literature has thus grown, and is growing, by leaps and bounds.  But 
its central assumption is still that the groupings available to the government are given and 
fixed.  The government cannot rearrange these groupings—it cannot increase or decrease 
the number of groups at the margin, nor can it choose one type of grouping over another. 
Thus on the one hand the assumption is that the groupings are available to the 
government without cost, yet on the other hand that it is too costly for the government to 
deviate from the groupings specified by the analyst.  However, if the implementation of 
tagging is itself costly, and if the costs are a function of the number and type of grouping 
available, the question arises—how many and which types of groups should the 
government choose to tag?  This is the question addressed in this paper. 
 
It should be intuitively obvious, and it is clear from the literature, that there are 
gains of moving from no grouping to some grouping, unless of course the groups chosen 
are identical to each other.  But how do these gains depend on the nature of the groups? 
How do they depend on the differences between groups?  And how do they depend on the 
number of groups?  Answers to these questions are the building blocks for a deeper 
analysis of the design of tagging, where the groupings can also be chosen by the 
government.  This paper takes the first steps in such an analysis.  Starting with a simple 
framework and ending with numerical simulations based on data from Finland, we show 
how groupings should be formed for tagging, and provide a quantitative assessment of 
how group differences affect the gains from tagging, and of the marginal welfare gains 
from increasing the number of groups being tagged. 
                                                 
4 Further, Kanbur-Tuomala (2005) analyze optimal aid allocation when the donor is faced with two 
potential recipient countries with their own specific characteristics. Each recipient government chooses its 
policies in light of its technology, preferences, and aid allocation. The donor has the task of choosing the 
aid allocation from a fixed pool of aid resources, to optimize the donor’s welfare function.  Bastani (2012) 
explores the optimal tax implications in a model with both singles and couples and inequality across as well 
as within households. 
5 Yet other recent analyses of age-dependent taxes include Erosa and Gervais (2002), Gervais (2003), 
Fennell and Stark (2005), and Lozachmeur (2006). 
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 The plan of the paper is as follows:  Section 2 of the paper sets out a starting 
framework, with two groups, simple transfers, and no behavioural responses.  It derives 
results for special cases in order to sharpen intuition on the determinants of the gains 
from grouping.  Section 3 introduces Finnish data on the age structure of income 
distribution, and provides illustrations of the simple results in the previous section. 
Section 4 moves to a more general framework of optimal non-linear income taxation with 
labor supply responses, where the optimal grouping problem can only be addressed 
through numerical simulations based on Finnish data, albeit guided by the intuitions 
developed in the previous section.  Section 4 also takes up the case of more than two 
groups and, again using Finnish data for application, providing a quantitative assessment 
of the gains from increasing the number of groups to be tagged.  Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2.   A Simple Framework 
 
 In this section we develop a simple framework for assessing the gains from 
different types of groupings.  We assume that there are no behavioural responses and we 
restrict attention to very simple tax and transfer regimes.  The government’s objective is 
to maximize a utilitarian social welfare function.  Only two groups are allowed.  The 
question of course is:  which two groups?  Because of its simplicity, the analytical 
framework allows us to derive closed form solutions, which in turn help to develop 
intuitions on what sorts of group differences are relevant for tagging.  After an illustration 
of the simple results with Finnish data in Section 3, Section 4 presents a more general 
model which relaxes many of these assumptions. 
 
 We focus attention on the case of two mutually exclusive and exhaustive groups, 
indexed 1 and 2.  Let income be denoted z and let density function of income in the 
groups be 1( )f z  and 2 ( )f z  with means 1z and 2z  respectively.  Let the population shares 
of the groups be 1  and 2 , with 1 2 1   .  The overall density is then  
 
 1 1 2 2( ) ( ) ( )f z f z f z                                                                              (1) 
 
The government’s objective function is given by 
 
 1 1 2 2( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )W u z f z dz u z f z dz u z f z dz                             (2) 
 
where u(z) is an individual level valuation function with u’>0 and u’’<0  in the usual 
way. 
 
 Consider now the simplest case of a group specific tax-transfer regime.  A lump 
sum tax 1a  is imposed on each member of group 1 and the proceeds are used to finance a 
lump sum payment of 2a  to each member of group 2.  The self-financing constraint 
implies that  
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 12 1
2
a a                                                                                           (3) 
 
Social welfare after the transfer is 
 
 11 1 1 2 1 2
2
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )W u z a f z dz u z a f z dz                       (4) 
 
and the impact of increasing 1a  on welfare is 
 
 11 1 1 1 2
1 2
{ '( ) ( ) '( ) ( ) }dW u z a f z dz u z a f z dz
da
                                (5) 
 
The optimal value of 1a  can be found by setting  
1
dW
da
 equal to zero.  This solves for 1a  
implicitly and we can then find the maximized value of W.  Although simple, the 
structure of the model still does not yield a closed form solution.  We can, however, focus 
attention on small taxes and transfers.  Evaluation 
1
dW
da
 at 1 0a   gives us 
 
1
1 2 1
1 0
{ '( ) ( ) '( ) ( ) }
a
dW u z f z dz u z f z dz
da


                                  (6)      
 
This depends solely on α1 and on the properties of 'u , 1( )f z  and 2 ( )f z , and can be used 
to sharpen our intuitions on what types of differences between 1( )f z  and 2 ( )f z  will 
maximize the welfare gain from the introduction of a tagged tax-transfer regime.  
 
 The two terms in curly brackets in (6) can be interpreted as the “distributional 
characteristic” of each group (Feldstein, 1972).  The term in curly brackets as a whole is 
thus a measure of how different the two groups are along this metric.  Equation (6) tells 
us that there are two features which determine groupings which will give the biggest 
impact on welfare with tagging—how different the groups are in terms of their 
population shares, and how different the groups are in terms of their distributional 
characteristic.  Now, it might seem from the first feature that is it best to choose one very 
small and one very large group in terms of population share.  But notice that in the limit, 
as one group comes closer and closer to becoming the whole population the difference in 
the curly brackets will disappear.  There thus appear to be subtle tradeoffs in group 
choice, which will depend also on the exact form of the valuation function (.)u .  We now 
develop a number of special cases to investigate this further. 
 
If 2 ( )f z  is a mean preserving spread of   1( )f z , then  
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1
1 0
( )0 ''' ( )0
a
dW u
da 
                                                     (7) 
 
 Furthermore, for any sign of '''u , the absolute magnitude of the impact of 
introducing the regime depends on the difference in inequality between the two groups. 
Among pairs of groupings with the same population share and the same mean, therefore 
the government should choose the pair with the maximum difference in inequality.  It 
should also be clear that, more generally, a related statement can be made for second 
order dominance between 1f and 2f . 
 
 If 1f  and 2f are not in the relation of a mean preserving spread, then further 
specification of the functional forms of either 1f and 2f , or of u(.), or of both,  will be 
needed  to get clear results.  Let 
 ( ) ;
p
p
p
z zu z z z
z
      
                                                                    (8) 
 
 0; pz z  
 
for 0  .  Then W will be recognized to be nothing other than the negative of the 
famous FGT family of poverty indices (Foster, Greer and Thorbecke, 1984): 
 
 
0
( )
p
pz
p
z zP f z dz
z


          (9) 
                         
Here  pz  is the poverty line and   is interpreted as the degree of poverty aversion.  
When 0  ,P  is simply the head count ratio of poverty, the fraction of individuals 
below the poverty line.  When 1   and 2  , the depth of poverty is also emphasized 
to different degrees. 
 
Noting 
 
 
1
'( ) ;
p
p
p p
z zu z z z
z z
      
          (10) 
 
 0; pz z  
 
the expression (6) now becomes: 
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1
1
2, 1 1, 1
1 0
{ }p
a
dW P P
da z  
 
 

                                                                   (11) 
 
where the subscript 1 and 2 on P indicates group specific poverty, and the subscript  1   
indicates a poverty aversion of 1  .  
 
 Expressions such as (11) are to be found in the literature on anti-poverty targeting 
(Kanbur, 1987, Besley-Kanbur, 1988).  For our purposes what it shows is that if its 
objective is to minimize povertyP , then for given population shares the government 
should choose groups with the biggest difference in
1
P  .  Thus if the objective is to 
minimize the poverty gap measure
1
P , the transfer should be across groups with the 
biggest difference in 
10
P -in other words the biggest differences in the head count ratio. 
 
 Further simplification of the form of u(.) to a quadratic provides a particularly 
simple result and interpretation.  Let                                            
 
 2( ) ( )u z z z                                            (12) 
 
where  
 
 1 1 2 2z z z                                                                                       (13) 
 
is the overall mean income.  Thus the government’s objective function is to minimize 
national variance through the mean preserving transfers across groups.  In this case 
 
 
1
1 1 2
1 0
2 ( )
a
dW z z
da


                                                                                 (14) 
 
Thus if the government is restricted to only two groups, then it should choose groups with 
the largest differences in means holding population shares constant, or largest difference 
in population shares holding differences in mean constant. 
 
 A similar focus on group means arises if the densities 1( )f z  and 2 ( )f z  are 
assumed to be lognormal densities: 
 
 2( ) ( , ). 1,2i i if z m i ?                                                                      (15) 
 
where im  and  
2
i  are the mean and variance respectively of log z  in the two groups.  
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We further assume that 
 
 11( )
1
ru z z
r
                                                                                             (16) 
 
in other words, a utility function with constant relative inequality aversion r.  In this case 
it can be shown that 
 
 
2 2 2 2 2
1 1 1 2 1 2
1
0.5 ( ) 0.5 ( )
1
1 0
[ ][ 1]rm r r m m r
a
dW e e
da
       

                                (17) 
 
Thus once again the distributional difference between the groups matters, but the key 
metric is now  
 
 2 2 21 2 1 2( ) 0.5 ( )r m m r                                                                           (18) 
 
Notice that when relative inequality aversion is unity, in other words the utility function 
is logarithmic, then the metric collapses to 
 
  2 21 1 2 2( 0.5 ) ( 0.5 )m m                                                                        (19) 
 
which again says that the government should use groupings with the largest difference in 
mean.  
 
 The final special case we consider is that of the utility function with constant 
absolute inequality aversion 
 
 1( ) gzu z e
g
                                                                                       (20) 
 
where g is the absolute inequality aversion parameter.   Substituting this in Equation 6 
still does not give a closed form solution.  While this can be calculated for empirical 
distributions, as it will be in the next sub-section, further specification is needed for an 
analytical closed form.  With this in mind, let the densities be exponential: 
 
 ( ) , 1,2ih zi if z h e i
                                                                                 (21) 
 
Then 
  
 
1
1 2
1
1 1 20a
h hdW
da g h g h


     
                                                                 (22) 
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Thus the impact is greatest when the two densities are most different from each other, as 
measured by the difference between their exponential parameters 1h  and 2h . 
 
 
3.         Application to Finnish Data on Age Structure of Income Distribution  
 
 What do the expressions developed in the previous section look like for actual 
data?  In this section we present an application to Finnish data, focusing on age based 
groupings.  This will also allow us to introduce the data we will use in the rest of the 
paper. 
 
 Estimates on age structure of income distribution from 1990 to 2007 are 
calculated from the Income Distribution Statistics (IDS) data source for Finland.  The 
IDS data is based on representative national sample survey of around 9000-11000 
households drawn from households in Finland.  The IDS contains information on 
incomes, taxes and benefits together with various socio-economic characteristics of the 
Finnish households.  Most of the information contained in the IDS has been collected 
from various administrative registers.  Auxiliary information is collected through 
interviews.  Examples of how this data has been used previously in other contexts are in 
Riihelä, Sullström and Tuomala (2008, 2012).  These papers also provide further detail 
on the specific properties of the data and its sources. 
 
 We begin with a preliminary look at basic patterns by age.  Figure 1 shows pre-
tax mean incomes by age in Finland in 1990, 2000 and 2007.  1990 and 2000 display the 
conventional inverse U-shaped pattern—the turning point is less clear in 2007.  Figure 2 
in turn displays Gini coefficients within age groups.  Within age-group inequality is 
higher in younger and older groups compared to in the middle age groups. 
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Figure 1 Pre tax income (mean) in age groups (excl. pensioners, unemployed and 
students etc.) in Finland 1990, 2000, 2007 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2  Gini coefficient for pre tax income in age groups (excl. pensioners, 
unemployed and students etc.) in Finland 1990, 2000, 2007 
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In what follows it will prove useful to represent within-cohort income 
distribution, as well as the overall income distribution, through a particular functional 
form.  Extensive empirical work has shown that Finnish data are well represented by a 
two parameter Champernowne distribution: 
 
1
2( ) ( )( )
m zf z
m z
 
 

   and ( ) 1 ( )
mF z
m z

      (23) 
 
where m is a parameter of central tendency and θ is a parameter of spread or inequality. 
Among two parameter distributions the Champernowne distribution is the best fitting for 
pre-tax income distribution in Finland (2002-2010).  The θ-parameter varies from 2.78 to 
2.34.  Over the period from the latter part of 1990’s to 2010 the θ-parameter was almost 
constant being around 2.5 (see Figure 3).  Hence θ =2 reflects a low range estimate (high 
inequality) and  θ =3 in turn a high range estimate (low inequality).  The Gini coefficients 
estimated by this distribution (Gini=1/θ ) are quite close to those calculated from the data.  
The location parameter m (median) in the Champernowne distribution is also quite close 
to that calculated from the data.  The Champernowne distribution also fits well for 
income distribution within age groups (Riihelä, Sullström, Tuomala, 2013).  For this 
reason in the rest of the paper we will use the estimated Champernowne distribution to 
represent income distribution within age groups and nationally. 
 
Figure 3 The shape parameter θ (with confidence interval): Champernowne 
distribution (Riihelä, Sullström, Tuomala, 2013) 
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 Figure 2 shows that within cohort inequality tends to have an inverse-U shape, 
with inequality being lowest in the middle age cohorts.  Thus if we want to form two 
groups with disparate inequality, we would combine the very young and the very old into 
one group and keep the middle age cohorts in another group.  However, policy typically 
works through dividing the population into groups ranked by age.  Thus if we wanted to 
form two groups of young  versus old with most disparate inequalities, it is not a priori 
obvious from Figure 2 where the cut-off should be drawn.  The same is true if our focus 
was difference in group means (Figure 1).  In any event, as we know from (6) it is not 
just these differences between groups which matters; the relative population in the groups 
which will also matter in determining the gains from tagging.  In what follows we present 
a series of quantitative assessments for an age cut-off of 30, 40, 50 and 60 years. 
 
 Let us start then with the case where the government’s objective is to minimize 
national variance through mean preserving transfers between two groups, which leads to 
the criterion given by (14).  Which groups should these be—in other words, which age 
cut-off maximizes the value of (14) in Finnish data?  Figure 4 provides the answer—the 
cut off which maximizes the gain to tagging across the groups it creates occurs at 40 
years.  What if the objective is to minimize the poverty gap, which leads to criterion (11) 
with γ = 1?  Then Figure 5 tells us that the cut-off to use for tagging is 30 years.  Finally, 
consider the case where the objective is an utiltitarian objective function with exponential 
utility function (20) with g = 0 or g = 1.  Figure 6 shows the value of the criterion (6) for 
the different age cut-offs6. It is seen that for both g = 0 and for g = 1, the optimum cut-off 
to create groups for tagging is 40 years. 
 
  
                                                 
6 Here age cut-offs are 30, 40 and 50 years 
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Figure 4 The government’s objective function is to minimize national variance 
through the mean preserving transfers across groups (estimates are based 
on year 2007). 
 
 
 
Figure 5 The government’s objective is to minimize poverty gap (estimates are 
based on year 2002) 
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Figure 6 Equation (6) with exponential utility function (20) with  g=0 and g=1  
 
 
 Thus, when we apply the simple framework of the previous section to actual data, 
we are able to give concrete form to the basic intuitions embodied in the expressions 
developed in the theoretical analysis.  The application shows that optimal groupings for 
tagging can indeed be identified, and that they will change as the objective function of the 
government changes.  The next section moves beyond the simple analysis by relaxing the 
many assumptions underlying it. 
 
4. Choice of Groups and Optimal Non-linear Income Taxation 
 
 The simple analytical framework of the last section, and the special functional 
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function, (iii) the distributional forms used and, perhaps most important, (iv) the 
assumption of no behavioural responses. In this section we turn to a more general 
formulation where these restrictions are relaxed.  We do this by setting the problem of 
choosing groups in the Mirrlees (1971) framework of optimal non-linear income taxation.  
 
 Suppose as before that the population (the size of which is normalized to unity) 
can be divided into two mutually exclusive and exhaustive groups, labelled 1 and 2. 
Individuals are unable to alter or disguise the group to which they belong, which is 
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0yV   (subscripts indicating partial derivatives). Individuals differ only in the pre-tax 
wage n they can earn. Gross income is z = ny.  The groups differ in the distribution of 
abilities, the latter being described for each group by a continuous density function if  
(with corresponding distribution ( )iF n ) on support [ ,n n ].The within-group structure of 
the model is thus exactly as in Mirrlees (1971). 
 
  Suppose that the aim of policy to design tax/benefit schedules ( )iT z for two different 
groups i=1, 2 to maximize the following social welfare criterion 
 
    ( ( ( )) ( )
n
i i i
n
W G u n f n dn   ,                                                                     (24) 
 
where αi denotes the proportion of the population in each group i and  G  is an increasing 
and concave function of utility.  The government cannot observe individuals’ productivities 
and thus is restricted to setting taxes and transfers as a function only of earnings, ( )iT z .  The 
government maximizes W subject to the revenue constraint 
 
    ( ( ) ( )) ( )
n
i i i i
n
z n x n f n dn R                                                                 (25) 
 
and the second constraint making use of workers utility maximization condition -  in each 
group , a person with wage n chooses y to maximize ui  subject to  x=ny-Ti(ny),  giving us 
the  incentive compatibility constraint constraints,  
 
( )
( ) ( )
i y ii yVdu
dn i n i
  for i=1,2.                                                                          (26)    
 
As shown in IKKT (1998), it is helpful to think of this problem as consisting of 
two steps.  First we derive group specific optimal tax schedules, given a group specific 
revenue requirement iR .  This means solving the standard Mirrlees problem for each 
group.  A number of treatments (for example, Tuomala, 1990) set out how this is done, 
and the implications for the tax schedule. 
 
Our focus, however, is on the gains from having two tagged groups rather than 
being forced to apply a single schedule to the population as a whole.  This takes us to the 
second step.  Given the solution the first step,  the government  chooses the optimal 
allocation of the aggregate R over  groups; in other words it chooses iR  to maximize 
overall W, having first maximized each Wi  for given total iR . 
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 Let us now apply this framework to the specific case of the data on the age 
structure of income distribution in Finland.  We begin by specifying social objectives 
further. Social welfare is taken to be utilitarian, so that  
 
 ( )G u u                   (27) 
   
We assume identical individual preferences of the form  
 
 1 1
(1 )
u
x y
                                                                                             (28) 
 
implying an elasticity of substitution between consumption and leisure in each groups of 
0.5.  
 
 Thus the two tagged groups differ only in their distribution of abilities.  As noted 
in the previous section, we assume that pre-tax incomes follow a Champernowne 
distribution nationally as well as within each age group.  Inference of parameters from 
observed empirical earnings distributions is a long-standing issue in the optimal income 
taxation literature.  A number of methods have been proposed, each with its own 
strengths and weaknesses.  Saez (2001) calibrates the exogenous ability distribution such 
that the actual T(.) yields empirical income distribution.  To calculate the optimal tax 
schedule, Saez makes additional assumptions about the models structure.  He assumes 
that the labour elasticity is constant.  Given this utility function he infers the ability 
distribution from the empirically observed distribution of incomes in the current tax 
regime (assuming a linear tax schedule).  However, the strong assumptions required for 
structural identification of the model reduce the confidence of the optimal tax schedule 
calculations.   Alternatively, Kanbur-Tuomala (1994) calibrate the skill distribution 
indirectly so that the income distribution inferred from the skill distribution matches the 
actual distribution.  Using this procedure there is no need to narrow further the set of 
functional forms used in simulations.  We follow this route in our illustrations on tagging 
with optimal non-linear income taxation. 
   
 We begin by dividing the Finnish working population into two groups on the 
basis of age with different age cutoffs.  As in Sections 2 and 3, the cut-offs are 30, 40 and 
50 years.  For each cutoff, we calculate the welfare gain from using that grouping.  The 
welfare gain reported in Table 1 is the proportional increase in equivalent consumption in 
moving from the optimal single schedule to the optimal group-specific schedules.  Table 
1 immediately gives us the answer to question to which grouping is best for tagging—it is 
the one which uses the age cut-off of 40 years. 
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Table 1   Welfare effects of different age cutoffs (Estimates of θ and m are based on 
year 2007) 
 
 
 
x0 : Consumption equivalent: x0 is that consumption which, if equally distributed with 
zero work hours, would give the same social welfare integral as the allocation ((x, y,)} 
arising from a given tax schedule. 
Single:  θ=2.5, m=0.368 
Two groups *:       group 1 [θ1=2.3, m1=0.202,  α1=0.21], group 2 [ θ2=2.6, m2=0.407, α2=0.79], 
cutoff at age 30 
Two groups **:     group 1 [θ1=2.4, m1=0.317,  α1=0.41], group 2 [ θ2=2.7, m2=0.417, α2=0.59], 
cutoff at age 40 
Two groups ***:   group 1 [θ1=2.5, m1=0.333,  α1=0.64], group 2 [ θ2=2.6, m2= 0.427. α2=0.36], 
cutoff at age 50 
 
 The discussion so far has maintained the number of groups at two.  But each of 
these groups could be further sub-divided, until there as many tax schedules as 
individuals.  Of course if increasing the number of instruments in this way was costless, it 
would make sense to do so because welfare cannot decrease with more instruments 
available.  However, what if instruments are costly—what if the costs of distinguishing 
between and monitoring across groups increases as a function of the number of groups? 
Then it would be optimal to limit the number of groups to well before the point where 
each individual is a group.  But how many groups is optimal?  The answer depends on the 
costs of administering each additional group and, crucially, the marginal welfare gain 
from increasing the number of groups.  We now turn to quantifying the gains from 
additional groups, in the specific context of our Finnish data set. 
 
 We proceed as follows.  We already know the welfare levels as a result of the 
optimal use of tagging for when there is only one group, and when there are two groups 
with an age cut off at 30.  We will now calculate the welfare level with three groups 
(under 30, between 30 and 40, and over 40) and four groups (under 30, between 30 and 
40, between 40 and 50, and over 50).  In each case we calculate the welfare when the 
government uses all the information available to tag groups and implements separate non-
linear income tax schedules for each group to maximize overall social welfare.  These 
welfare levels are given in Table 2.  
 
 
 utilitarian  
 x0 change % 
Single schedule 0.163  
two groups* 0.167 1.81 
two groups** 0.170 4.10 
two groups*** 0.165 1.23 
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Table 2   Welfare levels of increasing the number of groups (Estimates of θ and m 
are based on year 2007)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
x0 : Consumption equivalent: x0 is that consumption which, if equally distributed with 
zero work hours, would give the same social welfare integral as the allocation ((x, y,)} 
arising from a given tax schedule. 
Two groups:  group 1 [θ1=2.3, m1=0.202,  α1=0.21], group 2 [ θ2=2.6 m2=0.407. α2=0.79],  
Three groups: group 1[θ1=2.3, m1=0.202,  α1=0.21], group 2 [θ2=2.4, m2=0.317, α2=0.20], 
group 3 [ θ3=2.7, m3= 0.427, α3=0.59],  
Four groups: group 1[θ1=2.3, m1=0.202,α1=0.21], group 2 [θ2=2.4, m2=0.317, α2=0.20], 
group 3[θ3=2.6 m3=0.407, 0.23], [θ4=2.5, m4=0.387,  α4=0.36] 
 
 It should be clear from Table 2 that there are strong diminishing returns to 
increasing the number of groups.  For this utilitarian case, welfare compared to the 
single group case increases by 2.4% with the introduction of two groups, but only a 
further 0.6% of the base welfare is added when the groupings are increased to three, and 
going from three groups to four groups only gives an additional 0.21%.  Thus the gains 
from increasing the number of groupings fall off quite rapidly. 
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
 The large literature on “tagging” shows that group specific tax and transfer 
schedules improve welfare over the case where the government is restricted to a single 
schedule over the whole population.  The central assumption, however, is that the 
groupings available to the government are given and fixed.  But how many and which 
types of groups should the government choose to tag?  This is the question addressed in 
this paper.  Starting with a simple framework and ending with numerical simulations 
based on data from Finland, we show how groupings should be formed for tagging, and 
provide a quantitative assessment of how group differences affect the gains from tagging. 
We also provide a quantitative assessment of the welfare gains from increasing the 
number of tagged groups.  We hope that these results are the first steps in a richer 
analysis of tagging which expands the question of design to the arena of choice over 
groups being tagged 
                                                                                    
 utilitarian  
 x0 change % 
Single schedule 0.163  
2 groups* 0.167 2.4 
3 groups** 0.168 3.0 
4 groups*** 0.1684 3.21 
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